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DBK WITH AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
Michael Soveriegn 
DBK alone is meaningless. Military relevance comes from the ability to hit what you can 
see. To do this it is necessary to analyze the synergy of DBK and a new class of 
autonomous weapons in a canonical scenario -- what might have occurred if Saddam 
Hussein's lunge in October 1994 had not stopped short of the Kuwait border. Although 
DBK can deter, the assumption in this case is that it did not; the issue is whether DBK 
mated to autonomous weapons can let the United States win in a timely manner, without 
major deployment or without having to buy new platforms. Autonomous weapons -- 
sensor-fuzed weapons (SFW), brilliant anti-tank submunition (BAT) and wide-area 
munitions (WAM) -- are those needing far less human guidance than earlier weapons and 
promising a high Pk if placed within range.  
Prior Studies 
Most prior studies suggest that armored thrusts can be stopped from the air alone using 
autonomous weapons. Examples include RAND's "The New Calculus" and "The Use of 
Long-Range Bombers to Counter Armored Invasions" and similar studies by Jasper 
Welch, Major General, USAF (Ret). A more recent study by OSD (S&R) examines the 
kill rate from onhand U.S. forces (plus those that can arrive over the next few weeks) in a 
scenario similar to Vigilant Warrior; they concluded that despite high kill ratios, most of 
the vehicles would reach Kuwait. A McDonnell- Douglas study showed similar results 
but a lower kill rate. Recent studies by JCS and the Navy suggest that more than one kill 
per sortie can be obtained even from today's unguided cluster munitions (v. the .01 rate in 
the Gulf but that mixes all sorts of sorties together).  
Recent work by Dr. Raymond Macedonia suggests that sensor- fuzed weapons (SFW) 
can generate powerful results if wide area mines are placed in attack corridors; attackers 
are forced to slow down for mine-clearing (and risk being hit from the air) or take large 
casualties from the mines themselves. Advanced WAMs could be used to help target 
more mines or guide SFWs. Commanders with DBK could deploy thin lines of WAMs 
and use the feedback to call in more SFW or ATACM-based WAMs -- even under bad 
visual conditions that might frustrate DBK.  
Study Parameters 
The results of the study are predicated on a careful definition of DBK and a reasonable 
characterization of autonomous weapons.  
DBK is the upper limit of what intelligence systems 10 years hence can be expected to 
do. It entails the precise location of enemy units and their general status, but not the status 
and location of each platform. The location of mobile units can be known intermittently 
but they do move over time. Not all this data will be known instantly by all units, nor is it 
equally available from difficult environments or in the face of countermeasures. There 
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would remain a gap between DBK and actual targeting that may require additional local 
information, man-in-the-loop, or very intelligent weapons with terminal guidance 
capability.  
The benefits of DBK are that it:  
• Removes uncertainty as to whether an attack is underway  
• Gives the location, composition, and status of the attacking units  
• Ensures sufficient knowledge on friendly units.  
During the Gulf War, the United States came close to achieving DBK at the outset of the 
air war. This knowledge, however, took a long time to acquire and degraded as soon as 
air actions raised uncertainties about the results. While DBK was not achieved for the 
ground war, JSTARS helped provide a real-time ground picture for the first time.  
DBK does not mean that all U.S. units would be in continuous possession of sufficient 
targeting information; that would require perfect C3, great mobility, and survivability. 
Direct-fire weapons, whether ground or air based, require more than DBK; they also need 
delicate and time-consuming reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting and maneuver 
actions, plus fast expenditure rates and therefore heavy logistics to produce sufficient 
kills.  
First-generation PGMs (e.g., laser-guided bombs) reduced the logistics requirements of 
combat but still required precise target information; they also put the designator and the 
platform at risk. Autonomous weapons, though, can be targeted with less precise 
information and in some cases (e.g., stand-off delivery) do not even put the launch 
platform at risk. DBK is needed to generate taskings, but the timing of mission 
scheduling is no longer so critical because moving targets can be localized again.  
Autonomous Weapons 
Autonomous weapons can select their own aimpoints and are available in quantity. Even 
though redundant kills reduce efficiency, overall kill rates can be high.  
• BAT is a 20-kg, self-guided (acoustic and IR) antitank round with a large 
acquisition area that permits a high Pk even when launched from medium altitude 
or from stand-off (e.g., MLRS, ATACMS, Tomahawk, or JSOW). Now in early 
testing, it is expected to cost less than $100,000 per but is unlikely to appear in 
large numbers before 2000 absent a more relaxed procurement cycle. 
• SFW is a smaller, self-guided IR hit-to-kill round with a smaller acquisition range 
designed for counter-battery applications, MLRS and ATACMS delivery, or low- 
and medium- altitude air drop. It is low-rate acquisition with a $20,000 price tag.  
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• WAM is a 16-kg mine capable of launch an SFW to about 100 meters. It can be 
remotely controlled; an improved version may be networked as a sensor field. It is 
designed for ground, artillery, or air delivery (an anti-helicopter variant is being 
developed). It is projected to emerge from engineering development in 1996 and 
cost $25,000 per.  
Order of Battle  
Using the Iraqi feint as a base, the following target set is assumed:  
• 4,000 armored vehicles  
• 200 high altitude SAM sites  
• 100 C3 sites  
• 20 long-range radar sites  
• 20 airfields  
• 200 SCUD support sites  
• 80 infrastructure nodes  
U.S. forces consist of:  
• 30 aircraft (F-15 and F-16) on hand because of the continued Southern Watch 
operations.  
• An aircraft carrier with 50 attack aircraft is nearby.  
• 100 long-range bombers from CONUS and Diego Garcia armed with sensor-
fuzed munitions dispersed from wind-adjusted tactical munitions dispensers 
(WATMDs).  
• 18 Apache helicopters (with Hellfire) out of Kuwait.  
• 24 A-10s (with Maverick, rockets, and 30mm) out of Kuwait.  
• Two reinforced brigades (to implant WAM) supported by MLRS and ATACMS 
(with SFW) as well as tube artillery with laser-guided projectiles (includes Allied 
ground forces).  
• Another 100 aircraft within 5 days.  
Other assumptions include:  
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• Air superiority is not an issue except near Iraqi air defense units; it is assumed 
that air attacks are launched from medium altitude to keep attrition low.  
• There is enough strategic warning to permit loading up on weapons (which are 
otherwise too sensitive to keep in the Middle East on a permanent basis).  
• No countermeasures were factored in even though anything that is a great 
advantage for one side will become a potential target for the other. In practice, the 
instruments of DBK will be attacked, dispersion will be used to frustrate 
autonomous weapons, and information warfare will be used to introduce delay 
into the sensor-to-shooter cycle.  
TABLE 1.  Various Weapons, Operational Load-Out, and Effective 
Mobility Kills per Sortie 
Number Platform Loadout   Kills/Sortie Kills/Day 
10  F/A-18  2 JSOW w/3 BAT each 2(3)  40 
20  F/A-18  2 JSOW w/6 SFW each 3(6)  120 
10  F/A-18  2 JSOW w/8 BAT each 6(8)  120 
10  F-14  2 JSOW w/3 BAT each 2(3)  40 
20  F-16  2 WCTMD w/32 SFW 3(32)  120 
10  F-15E  2 WCTMD w/32 SFW 8(32)  160 
20  A-10  Hfire & 2 Maverick  4(16)  160 
50  ATACMS 12 BAT   3(6)  150 
50  ATACMS 24 SFW   4(12)  200 
100  MLRS  6 SFW    1.5(3)  150 
10  B-2  16 TMD w/40 SFW  32(320) 80 
90  B-1  16 WCTMD w/32 SFW 25(256) 562 
100  Tomahawk 16 BAT   4(8)  400 
18  AH-64  Hellfire   4(16)  216 
Table 1 contains the various weapons, operational load-out, and effective mobility kills 
per sortie (assuming a Pk of 50 percent). Sortie rates over the first 10 days are three a day 
for helicopters, two a day for fixed- wing aircraft in theater, once every 2 days for 
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bombers out of Diego Garcia, once every 4 days for CONUS-based bombers. Launch 
rates for ATACMS and MLRS are 200 a day total. The figure in parenthesis is nominal 
kills per sortie, the difference reflecting wastage due to multiple submunitions targeted on 
an aimpoint. See the appendix for a more detailed discussion of the difference.  
The basic results, shown in the right-most column, indicate that a modestly size air attack 
force, if not otherwise diverted, could kill half the targets (2618) in the first day of 
combat. These rates (four kills per sortie, 2,600 per day) far exceed rates from Desert 
Shield thanks to DBK, autonomous weapons, and the fact that armor, when it moves, is 
out in the open. No kills were calculated for WAM but they play a large role in slowing 
down the attack so that sufficient attrition can be effected before Kuwait (and thus cover) 
is reached.  
Implications and Limitations 
Implications fall into five areas: DBK itself, munitions, C3/training, geo-location, and 
survivability.  
DBK: Even if major military formations can be located, they cannot necessarily be 
targeted. Environmental constraints, sensor revisit time, the complexity of processing and 
fusion, and simple task overloading can result in significant delays before C3 systems get 
their information. Many sorties will be working with out-of-date information on mobile 
units. Even autonomous weapons require a degree of target localization that delays deny 
them. The status of targets is also hard to assess. Battle damage assessment was difficult 
in the Gulf War. The ability to fuze videotapes from guns, and laser-guided bombs should 
increase our ability to know what these weapons do, but autonomous weapons present 
new difficulties (no one is necessarily looking). If battle damage assessment is bad, 
autonomous weapons will not work as well. WAMs used to see which vehicles are 
moving may help BDA.  
Autonomous Weapons: Although good munitions made the scenario work, the U.S. 
military traditionally holds off on buying high-end munitions preferring to wait until they 
get better or cheaper. This strategy may work for long wars but not short ones. This 
scenario needs between 10 and 20 thousand autonomous weapons to work. Delivery 
systems will cost more if they have to be stand- off (e.g., Tomahawk JSOW), but even so, 
they remain cheaper than new launch platforms.  
C3 and Training: Sensor-to-shooter delays degrade DBK (a motivation for the other 
side's IW efforts). DBK is also degraded if tactical development and training do not keep 
up with new systems. Joint training and exercises are implied because of the global 
nature of DBK and the mix of forces that must be on scene to carry out this scenario.  
Geo-Location: The conversion of DBK to targeting requires platforms be aware of their 
own location, speed, and acceleration in three dimensions. Thus the vulnerability of GPS 
matters.  
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Survivability: Attack forces, DBK equipments, and their supporting C3 infrastructure all 
must survive enemy attack to make the scenario work. The small U.S. forces could be 
suppressed, attacked, or diverted (e.g., to SCUD hunts) by unexpected enemy 
capabilities. Often a stand-down is necessary to fix problems.  
Appendix 
Although the number of weapons on an aircraft is subject to physical limits (weight, 
attach points, etc.), maximum payloads are rarely achieved because of the tradeoff of 
weapons for fuel, inventory limits, and the possibility of having to drop a load for tactical 
reasons. The number of BAT submunitions, for example, is limited by the desire for 
flexibility depending, the model of aircraft, internal versus external carriage, and other 
factors.  
A more careful analysis would consider the geometry of attack and the target set. 
Delivery means also matter -- e.g., whether a standoff launch can be achieved that 
surprises the enemy and therefore precludes the dispersion of targets. But tactics are hard 
to anticipate for any scenario.  
The translation between nominal and effective kills per sortie must take many factors into 
account:  
• The delivery of sensor-fuzed weapons from tactical munitions dispensers from 
medium altitude will probably waste most sub- munitions; they are unlikely to 
make contact unless targets are parked close together.  
• BATs have a greater acquisition rate than SFWs, and their search behaviors can 
be adjusted; thus their kill rate is higher  
• A night-flying B-2 can drop the same tactical munition dispenser of SFWs with 
many kills because its radar target mapping is accurate; with short warning time, 
targets are not likely to be dispersed.  
• Stand off-weapons such as the SLAM (a Harpoon variant) and JSOW will provide 
a low wastage rate because they carry small numbers of sub-munitions and are 
individually targeted from so far off that they will result in similar surprise.  
• TMDs and Tomahawks carry large numbers of sub-munitions are inherently 
subject to wastage rates as high as 90 percent if the submunition has a small 
acquisition area (e.g., SFW). With several minutes of free fall time, they are 
affected by wind and are therefore inaccurate. Wind-corrected TMD can be 
accurate from higher up if the target location is well known at launch time. Their 
guidance works off GPS and would best served fixed targets and those identified 
by radar target mapping.  
• JDAM is a GPS-guided weapon comparable in punch to the Mk-82 series of 
bombs. When dropped from high altitudes, it can achieve surprise, but moving 
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targets may depart from their original location in the meantime (unless the bomb 
is updated in flight). Thus JDAMs are likely to be used against fixed targets 
(except from B-2s which can fly low at night). Both JDAM and WCTMDs can 
carpet bomb an area.  
• MLRS and ATACMS can operate with low wastage of SFW against up-to-date 
locations of concentrated but surprised forces or against fixed targets. But under 
current conditions they would have a high wastage against moving armored 
columns.  
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A popular Government, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, 
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance; And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm 
themselves with the power which knowledge gives.  
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